COP 4610

Operating System Principles

Security

1

The Security Problem

- System secure if resources used and accessed as intended under all circumstances
 - Unachievable!
- Intruders (crackers) attempt to breach security
- Threat is potential security violation
- Attack is an attempt to breach security
- Attack can be accidental or malicious
- Easier to protect against accidental than malicious misuse

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles

Security Violation Categories

- · CIA triad:
 - Breach of confidentiality
 - · Unauthorized reading of data
 - Breach of integrity
 - · Unauthorized modification of data
 - Breach of availability
 - Unauthorized destruction of data
- Theft of service
 - Unauthorized use of resources
- Denial of service (DOS)
 - Prevention of legitimate use

COP 4610 - Operating System Principles

3

Security Violation Methods

- Masquerading
 - Pretending to be an authorized user to escalate privileges
- Replay attack
 - As is or with message modification
- Man-in-the-middle attack
 - Intruder sits in data flow, masquerading as sender to receiver and vice versa
- Session hijacking
 - Intercept an already-established session to bypass authentication

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles

Security Measure Levels

- Impossible to have absolute security, but make cost to perpetrator sufficiently high to deter most intruders
- Security must occur at four levels to be effective:
 - Physical
 - Human
 - Operating System
 - Network

COP 4610 - Operating System Principles

5

Program Threats

- Many variations, many names
- Trojan Horse
 - Code segment that misuses its environment
 - Exploits mechanisms for allowing programs written by users to be executed by other users
- Trap Door
 - Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures
 - Typically meant for benign purposes

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles

е

Program Threats (Cont.)


- Logic Bomb
 - Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances
- Stack and Buffer Overflow
 - Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory buffers)
 - Failure to check bounds on inputs, arguments
 - Write past arguments on the stack into the return address on stack
 - When routine returns from call, returns to hacked address
 - Pointed to code loaded onto stack that executes malicious code
 - Unauthorized user or privilege escalation

COP 4610 - Operating System Principles

C Program with Buffer-overflow Condition


```
#include <stdio.h>
#define BUFFER SIZE 256
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
   char buffer[BUFFER SIZE];
   if (argc < 2)
      return -1;
   else {
      strcpy(buffer,argv[1]);
      return 0;
   }
}</pre>
```

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles



Modified Shell Code

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
  execvp(''\bin\sh'', ''\bin
  \sh'', NULL);
  return 0;
}
```



Program Threats (Cont.)

Viruses

- Code fragment embedded in legitimate program
- Self-replicating, designed to infect other computers
- Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system, applications
- Usually borne via email or as a macro
 - Visual Basic Macro to reformat hard drive

```
Sub AutoOpen()
Dim oFS
Set oFS = CreateObject(''Scripting.FileSystemObject'')
vs = Shell(''c:command.com /k format c:'',vbHide)
End Sub
```

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles

12

Program Threats (Cont.)

- Virus dropper inserts virus onto the system
- Many thousands of virus types
 - File / parasitic
 - Boot / memory
 - Macro
 - Source code
 - Polymorphic to avoid having a virus signature
 - Encrypted
 - Stealth
 - Tunneling
 - Multipartite
 - Armored

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles

13

13

A Boot-Sector Computer Virus virus copies boot sector to unused location X Virus replaces original boot block with itself with itself memory, hidse in memory above new limit virus attaches to disk read-write interrupt, monitors all disk activity. It blocks any attempts of other programs to write the boot sector to wreak havoc at a certain date 14

The Threat Continues

- · Attacks still common, still occurring
- Attacks moved over time from science experiments to tools of organized crime
 - Targeting specific companies
 - Creating botnets to use as tool for spam and DDOS delivery
 - Keystroke logger to grab passwords, credit card numbers
- Why is Windows the target for most attacks?
 - Most common
 - Everyone is an administrator
 - Monoculture considered harmful

COP 4610 - Operating System Principles

15

15

System and Network Threats (Cont.)

- Worms use spawn mechanism; standalone program
- Internet worm
 - Exploited UNIX networking features (remote access) and bugs in finger and sendmail programs
 - Exploited trust-relationship mechanism used by rsh to access friendly systems without use of password
 - Grappling hook program uploaded main worm program
 99 lines of C code
 - Hooked system then uploaded main code, tried to attack connected systems
 - Also tried to break into other user accounts on local system via password guessing
 - If target system already infected, abort, except for every 7th time

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles

System and Network Threats (Cont.)

Port scanning

- Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one or a range of IP addresses
- Detection of answering service protocol
- Detection of OS and version running on system
- nmap scans all ports in a given IP range for a response
- nessus has a database of protocols and bugs (and exploits) to apply against a system
- Frequently launched from zombie systems
 - · To decrease traceability

COP 4610 - Operating System Principles

17


17


System and Network Threats (Cont.)


Denial of Service


- Overload the targeted computer preventing it from doing any useful work
- Distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) come from multiple sites at once
- Consider the start of the TCP/IP-connection handshake (SYN)
 - How many started-connections can the OS handle?
- Consider traffic to a web site
 - How can you tell the difference between being a target and being really popular?
- Accidental CS students writing bad fork () code
- Purposeful extortion, punishment

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles










Substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another - monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq E.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc

23

• 64-bit key (56-bits + 8-bit parity) • 16 rounds • Each Round Initial permutation Round 18 Final permutation COP 4610 - Operating System Principles

Data Encryption Standard • Repeat for larger messages Block₁ Block Block Block₄ DES DES DES DES Cipher COP 4610 – Operating System Principles 25



RSA (cont)

- Choose two large prime numbers p and q (each 256 bits)
- Multiply *p* and *q* together to get *n*
- Choose the encryption key e, such that e and (p 1) x (q 1) are relatively prime.
- Two numbers are relatively prime if they have no common factor greater than one
- Compute decryption key *d* such that

$$d*e = 1 \mod ((p - 1) \times (q - 1))$$

- Construct public key as (e, n)
- Construct private key as (d, n)
- Discard (do not disclose) original primes p and q

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles

27

c = me mod n

28

27

RSA Example

Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24.

letter

e=5 (so *e, z* relatively prime). *d=29* (so *ed-1* exactly divisible by z).

encrypt: 1 12 1524832 17

 \underline{c} \underline{c}^{u} $\underline{m} = \underline{c}^{d} \mod n$ <u>letter</u> 17 481968572106750915091411825223072000 12 |

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles

28

decrypt:

Message Digest

- Cryptographic checksum
 - just as a regular checksum protects the receiver from accidental changes to the message, a cryptographic checksum protects the receiver from malicious changes to the message.
- One-way function
 - given a cryptographic checksum for a message, it is virtually impossible to figure out what message produced that checksum; it is not computationally feasible to find two messages that hash to the same cryptographic checksum.
- Relevance
 - if you are given a checksum for a message and you are able to compute exactly the same checksum for that message, then it is highly likely this message produced the checksum you were given.

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles


29


30


29

Authentication Protocols

• Three-way handshake







Message Integrity Protocols

- · Digital signature using RSA
 - special case of a message integrity where the code can only have been generated by one participant
 - compute signature with private key and verify with public key
- Keved MD5
 - sender: $m + MD5(m + k) + E(E(k,rcv_public), snd_private)$
 - receive
 - recovers random key using the sender's public key
 - applies MD5 to the concatenation of this random key message
- MD5 with RSA signature
 - sender: m + E(MD5(m), private)
 - receiver
 - · decrypts signature with sender's public key
 - · compares result with MD5 checksum sent with message

COP 4610 - Operating System Principles

33

33

Public Key Distribution

- Certificate
 - special type of digitally signed document:
 - "I certify that the public key in this document belongs to the entity named in this document, signed X."
 - the name of the entity being certified
 - the public key of the entity
 - the name of the certification authority
 - a digital signature
- Certification Authority (CA)
 - administrative entity that issues certificates
 - useful only to someone that already holds the CA's public key

COP 4610 – Operating System Principles

Key Distribution (cont)

- Chain of Trust
 - if X certifies that a certain public key belongs to Y, and Y certifies that another public key belongs to Z, then there exists a chain of certificates from X to Z
 - someone that wants to verify Z's public key has to know X's public key and follow the chain
- Certificate Revocation List

COP 4610 - Operating System Principles

35

35

Certificate Serial number (unique to issuer) • info about certificate owner including algorithm and key value itself (not shown) info about certificate This Certificate belongs to: Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority Verisign, Inc. This Certificate was issued by: Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority issuer valid dates Serial Number: 00:CD:BA:7F:56:F0:DF:E4:BC:54:FE:22:AC:B3:72:AA:55 This Certificate is valid from Sun Jan 28, 1996 to Tue Aug 01, 2028 digital Oertificate Fingerprint: 97:60:E8:57:5F:D3:50:47:E5:43:0C:94:36:8A:80:62 signature by This Certificate belongs to a Certifying Authority Accept this Certificate Authority for Certifying network sites issuer Accept this Certificate Authority for Certifying e-mail users Accept this Certificate Authority for Certifying software developers Warn before sending data to sites certified by this authority OK Cancel

User Authentication

- Crucial to identify user correctly, as protection systems depend on user ID
- User identity most often established through passwords, can be considered a special case of either keys or capabilities
- Passwords must be kept secret
 - Frequent change of passwords
 - History to avoid repeats
 - Use of "non-guessable" passwords
 - Log all invalid access attempts (but not the passwords themselves)


COP 4610 - Operating System Principles

37

37

Secure Shell (SSH)

- Remote login service (replaces telnet and rlogin).
- Provides authentication, integrity, and confidentiality.
- SSH version 2: SSH-TRANS, SSH-AUTH, SSH-CONN.




COP 4610 – Operating System Principles

38

Transport Layer Security (TLS)

- Secure Socket Layer (SSL).
- Secure HTTP (HTTPS).
- Handshake protocol and record protocol.




COP 4610 - Operating System Principles

39

39

Firewalls



- Filter-Based Solution
 - example

(192.12.13.14, 1234, 128.7.6.5, 80) (*,*, 128.7.6.5, 80)

- default: forward or not forward?
- how dynamic?

COP 4610 - Operating System Principles

Problem: complex policy Problem: complex policy Example: web server Provided the provided of the provided of