

# IP = PSPACE

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**Abstract.** In this paper, it is proven that when both randomization and interaction are allowed, the proofs that can be verified in polynomial time are exactly those proofs that can be generated with polynomial space.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.1.1 [**Computation by Abstract Devices**]: Models of Computation—*bounded-action devices (e.g., Turing machines, random access machines)*; F.1.2 [**Computation by Abstract Devices**]: Modes of Computation—*interactive computation, probabilistic computation, relations among modes*; F.1.3 [**Computation by Abstract Devices**]: Complexity Classes—*complexity hierarchies, relations among complexity classes*

General Terms: Algorithms, Theorem

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Interactive proofs, IP, PSPACE

## 1. Introduction

The class IP of languages that have efficient interactive proofs of membership was introduced by Goldwasser et al. [8], and in a slightly different form by Babai [1] (the equivalence between these models was established by Goldwasser and Sipser [7]). A language  $L$  belongs to IP if a probabilistic polynomial time verifier  $V$  can be convinced by some prover  $P$  to accept any  $x \in L$  with overwhelming probability, but cannot be convinced by any prover  $P'$  to accept any  $x \notin L$  with a nonnegligible probability. Goldreich et al. [6] showed that IP contains some languages believed not to be in NP, but its exact characterization remained a major open problem for several years. In a breakthrough paper, Lund et al. [10] made ingenious use of earlier results by Valiant [12], Toda [11] Beaver and Feigenbaum [2] and Lipton [9] to prove that IP contains the polynomial hierarchy PH. In this paper, we use surprisingly simple techniques to extend the previous results and prove that IP contains PSPACE. Since every IP language is trivially accepted by the PSPACE machine that traverses the tree of all the possible interactions, this result completely characterizes IP.

The interactive proofs introduced in this paper use only public coins, are accepted with probability 1 when the prover is honest, and require only logarithmic workspace when the verifier is given a 2-way access to his random

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tape. They can be turned into zero knowledge proofs under the sole assumption that one-way functions exist by using known techniques.

## 2. Quantified Boolean Formulas

The class of quantified Boolean formulas (QBF) is defined as the closure of the set of Boolean variables  $x_i$  and their negations  $\bar{x}_i$  under the operations  $\wedge$  (and),  $\vee$  (or),  $\forall x_i$  (universal quantification), and  $\exists x_i$  (existential quantification). These operations can be mixed in any order, and in particular we do not require that all the quantifiers appear in a leftmost prefix. For the sake of convenience, we add the boolean equality operation, denote vectors of boolean variables by  $X_i$ , and extend the operations  $=, \forall, \exists$  from single variables  $x_i$  to vectors of variables  $X_i$  in the obvious way.

A QBF in which all the variables are quantified is called *closed*, and can be evaluated to either  $T$  (true) or  $F$  (false). An *open* QBF with  $k > 0$  free variables can be interpreted as a boolean function from  $\{T, F\}^k$  to  $\{T, F\}$ .

The interactive proofs presented in this paper can only handle QBFs of a special type:

*Definition.* A closed QBF is called *simple* if in the given syntactic representation every occurrence of each variable is separated from its point of quantification by at most one universal quantifier (and arbitrarily many other symbols).

*Example.*  $\forall x_1 \forall x_2 \exists x_3 [(x_1 \vee x_2) \wedge \forall x_4 (x_2 \wedge x_3 \wedge x_4)]$  is simple, since:

- (1)  $x_1$  is used once, and only  $\forall x_2$  separates its point of quantification from its point of use,
- (2)  $x_2$  is used twice; its first use is not separated from its point of quantification by any universal quantifiers, whereas its second use is separated only by  $\forall x_4$ ,
- (3)  $x_3$  is used once, and separated only by  $\forall x_4$ ,
- (4)  $x_4$  is used once, and not separated by any universal quantifiers.

*Example.*  $\forall x_1 \forall x_2 [(x_1 \wedge x_2) \wedge \forall x_3 (\bar{x}_1 \wedge x_3)]$  is not simple, since the second occurrence of  $x_1$  (which is negated) is separated from its point of quantification by both  $\forall x_2$  and  $\forall x_3$ .

The notion of simple QBFs seems to be quite restrictive. However, we can prove:

**THEOREM 1.** *Every QBF of size  $n$  can be transformed into an equivalent simple QBF whose size is polynomial in  $n$ .*

**PROOF.** To turn a given QBF into a simple QBF, we completely rename all the Boolean variables after each universal quantifier, by introducing new existentially quantified Boolean variables  $x_i^j$  to denote the  $j$ th name of the  $i$ th variable, and equating each  $x_i^j$  with its previous name  $x_i^{j-1}$ . Consider, for example, the QBF

$$\exists x_1 \forall x_2 \exists x_3 \forall x_4 \exists x_5 \cdots Q(x_1, x_2, \dots).$$

in which  $Q$  is quantifier free. The transformed QBF is:

$$\begin{aligned} & \exists x_1^0 \forall x_2^0 \exists x_1^1 (x_1^1 = x_1^0) \wedge \exists x_3^0 \forall x_4^0 \exists x_1^2 \exists x_2^1 \exists x_3^1 \\ & (x_1^2 = x_1^1) \wedge (x_2^1 = x_2^0) \wedge (x_3^1 = x_3^0) \wedge \exists x_5^0 \cdots Q(x_1^1, x_2^1, \dots) \end{aligned}$$

where  $x_i^j$  is the last name given to the initial boolean variable  $x_i^0$ . This QBF is simple by definition, and contains a quadratic number of variables (compared to the original QBF).  $\square$

### 3. The Arithmetization of QBF

The problem of deciding whether a given closed QBF is true or false can be expressed in an arithmetic form by using the following syntactic transformations:

- (1) Replace each Boolean variable  $x_i$  by a new variable  $z_i$  which can range over the (positive and negative) integers  $\mathbb{Z}$ .
- (2) Replace each occurrence of  $\bar{x}_i$  by  $(1 - z_i)$ .
- (3) Replace  $\wedge$  by integer multiplication  $\cdot$ ,  $\vee$  by integer addition  $+$ , the universal quantification  $\forall x_i$  by the integer product  $\prod_{z_i \in \{0,1\}}$ , and the existential quantifier  $\exists x_i$  by the integer sum  $\sum_{z_i \in \{0,1\}}$ .

*Example.* Consider the true QBF:

$$B = \forall x_1 \exists x_2 [(x_1 \wedge x_2) \vee \exists x_3 (\bar{x}_2 \wedge x_3)].$$

Its arithmetization yields:

$$A = \prod_{z_1 \in \{0,1\}} \sum_{z_2 \in \{0,1\}} \left[ (z_1 \cdot z_2) + \sum_{z_3 \in \{0,1\}} (1 - z_2) \cdot z_3 \right],$$

which can be evaluated to the integer 2.

**THEOREM 2.** *A closed QBF  $B$  is true iff the value of its arithmetic form  $A$  is nonzero.*

**PROOF.** By straightforward induction on the structure of  $B$ .  $\square$

*Remarks.*

- (1) A problem may arise if we try to express a negated  $\bar{B}$  directly as  $(c - A)$ , since the value  $c$  of the arithmetic form  $A$  of  $B$  is difficult to compute. We avoid this difficulty by allowing negated variables but no negated expressions in our definition of QBFs. This is not a real limitation, since we can always push the negations in  $B$  all the way to the variables without increasing its structural complexity.
- (2) We cannot replace the boolean  $=$  by arithmetic  $=$ , since we want to interpret different non-zero integers as the same Boolean value  $T$ . We thus have to replace  $x_i = x_j$  by  $(x_i \wedge x_j) \vee (\bar{x}_i \wedge \bar{x}_j)$  and arithmetize the expression as  $z_i z_j + (1 - z_i)(1 - z_j)$ .

When  $B$  is true, the value of  $A$  can be quite large. However, we can upper bound this value as follows:

**THEOREM 3.** *Let  $B$  be a closed QBF of size  $n$ . Then the value of its arithmetic form  $A$  cannot exceed  $O(2^{2^n})$ .*

**PROOF.** For any (potentially open) subexpression  $B'$  of  $B$ , define  $v(B')$  as the maximal value of the arithmetic form of  $B'$  under all the possible 0/1 substitutions to the free variables.

This value satisfies:

- (1) If  $B'$  is  $x_i$  or  $\bar{x}_i$ , then  $v(B') = 1$ .
- (2) If  $B'$  is  $B'' \vee B'''$ , then  $v(B') \leq v(B'') + v(B''')$ .
- (3) If  $B'$  is  $B'' \wedge B'''$ , then  $v(B') \leq v(B'') \cdot v(B''')$ .
- (4) If  $B'$  is  $\exists x_i B''$ , then  $v(B') \leq 2v(B'')$ .
- (5) If  $B'$  is  $\forall x_i B''$ , then  $v(B') \leq v(B'')^2$ .
- (6) When  $B'$  is closed,  $v(B')$  coincides with the value of its arithmetic form.

It is easy to verify that  $O(2^{2^n})$  satisfies all the recursive inequalities. This bound cannot be substantially improved, since for

$$B = \forall x_1 \forall x_2 \cdots \forall x_{n-1} \exists x_n (x_n \vee \bar{x}_n),$$

$v(\exists x_n (x_n \vee \bar{x}_n)) = 2$ , and each universal quantifier squares the previous value.  $\square$

Since such large numbers cannot be handled by the polynomial time verifiers in our interactive protocols, we reduce them modulo some smaller prime  $p$ .

**THEOREM 4.** *Let  $B$  be a closed QBF of size  $n$ . Then there exists a prime  $p$  of length polynomial in  $n$  such that  $A \neq 0 \pmod{p}$  iff  $B$  is true.*

**PROOF.** Assume first that  $A$  is a non-zero integer. If it is zero modulo all the polynomial size primes, then by the Chinese remainder theorem it is zero modulo their product as well. Since by the prime number theorem this product is  $\Omega(2^{2^{nd}})$  for any desired constant  $d$ , this contradicts the assumption that  $A$  is non-zero and at most  $O(2^{2^n})$ . On the other hand, if  $B$  is false, then  $A = 0$  modulo any prime.  $\square$

#### 4. Interactive Proofs for PSPACE Languages

Since deciding the truth of (simple) QBFs is known to be PSPACE complete (see Garey and Johnson [5]), it suffices to demonstrate the existence of interactive proofs for this problem. Given the arithmetic form  $A$  of a simple QBF  $B$ , we want to prove that  $A \neq 0 \pmod{p}$  for some polynomially long prime  $p$ . This prime can be chosen by the prover  $P$  and sent to the verifier  $V$  (along with a written proof of primality) as the first step of the interactive proof, since even an infinitely powerful cheating prover cannot find such a prime if  $A = 0$ . Alternatively, we can ask  $V$  to choose a random prime  $p$ , and use the fact that for most  $p$ ,  $A \neq 0 \pmod{p}$  iff  $B$  is true. This makes it possible to prove both membership and non-membership by the same protocol, but has imperfect completeness (even an honest prover may be unable to prove a correct statement if the verifier chooses a prime divisor of  $A$ ).

Given a closed arithmetic expression  $A$ , we define its *functional form*  $A'$  by eliminating the leftmost  $\sum_{z_i \in \{0,1\}}$  or  $\prod_{z_i \in \{0,1\}}$  symbol, and considering  $A'$  as a polynomial function  $q(z_i)$  of one free variable  $z_i$ . The *randomized form* of  $A$  is  $A'(z_i = r)$  in which  $z_i$  is set to a random number  $r$  modulo  $p$  supplied by the verifier. This randomized form can again be evaluated to a constant, but its number of  $\Sigma$  and  $\Pi$  symbols is reduced by 1. Note that the simplicity of  $A$  is preserved by these transformations.

*Example.* Consider the true QBF:

$$B = \forall x_1 [\bar{x}_1 \vee \exists x_2 \forall x_3 (x_1 \wedge x_2) \vee x_3],$$

and assume that  $p$  is large enough so that the following calculations are not affected by modular reductions. The arithmetic form of  $B$  is

$$A = \prod_{z_1 \in \{0,1\}} \left[ (1 - z_1) + \sum_{z_2 \in \{0,1\}} \prod_{z_3 \in \{0,1\}} (z_1 \cdot z_2 + z_3) \right],$$

whose value is 2. The functional form of  $A$  is:

$$A' = \left[ (1 - z_1) + \sum_{z_2 \in \{0,1\}} \prod_{z_3 \in \{0,1\}} (z_1 \cdot z_2 + z_3) \right].$$

By evaluating all the summations and products, the infinitely powerful prover can express  $A'$  as the polynomial

$$q(z_1) = z_1^2 + 1.$$

The randomized form of  $A'$  with  $z_1 = 3$  can be expressed as

$$A'(z_1 = 3) = \left[ (1 - 3) + \sum_{z_2 \in \{0,1\}} \prod_{z_3 \in \{0,1\}} (3z_2 + z_3) \right],$$

whose value 10 can be deduced from  $q(3) = 3^2 + 1 = 10$ .

The polynomial  $q(z_i)$  that represents  $A'$  can have an exponentially high degree. Consider, for example, the QBF

$$B = \forall x_1 \forall x_2 \cdots \forall x_n (x_1 \vee x_2 \vee \cdots \vee x_n),$$

whose arithmetization is

$$A = \prod_{z_1 \in \{0,1\}} \prod_{z_2 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \prod_{z_n \in \{0,1\}} (z_1 + z_2 + \cdots + z_n).$$

The polynomial  $q(z_1)$  of its functional form  $A'$  is the product of  $2^{n-1}$  terms of the form  $(z_1 + c)$  for  $0 \leq c \leq n$ , which is a dense polynomial of degree  $2^{n-1}$ . Such polynomials cannot be handled by the polynomial time verifier during the interactive proof. However, for simple QBFs we can prove:

**THEOREM 5.** *If  $B$  is simple, then the degree of the polynomial  $q(z_i)$  that describes the functional form of  $A$  grows at most linearly with the size of  $B$ .*

**PROOF.** Let  $x_i$  be the leftmost quantified variable in  $B$ . The degree of  $z_i$  created by any quantifier-free subexpression of  $B$  is bounded by the size of the subexpression. Summations over arbitrarily many other variables can change the coefficients but not the degree of the polynomial, and each product can at most double the degree. The result follows from the fact that in simple  $B$  such a doubling can occur at most once.  $\square$

*Remark.* By adding sufficiently many dummy variables to the quantifier-free subexpressions of  $B$ , this degree can be reduced to 3, and thus  $q(z_i)$  can be represented by just four numbers in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . Consider for example  $B = \forall x_i B'$  where  $x_i$  occurs  $k$  times in  $B'$ . This expression can be replaced by

$$\forall x_i^1 \exists x_i^2 \cdots \exists x_i^k (x_i^1 = x_i^2 = \cdots = x_i^k) \wedge B'',$$

where  $B''$  is obtained from  $B'$  by using a different  $x'_i$  variable in each occurrence of  $x_i$  in  $B'$ . If  $B$  is simple and the multiple equality is arithmetized as  $z_i^1 \cdot z_i^2 \cdots z_i^k + (1 - z_i^1)(1 - z_i^2) \cdots (1 - z_i^k)$ , the degree of each functional form is at most 3.

The interactive protocol for proving that  $A \neq 0 \pmod{p}$  is very simple. The prover  $P$  sends the claimed value  $a$  of  $A \pmod{p}$  to the verifier  $V$ , and justifies this claim by considering successively smaller subexpressions of  $A$ . At any intermediate stage of the protocol, the current expression  $A$  is split into  $A_1 + A_2$  or  $A_1 \cdot A_2$  where  $A_1$  is a polynomial with fully instantiated variables (whose value  $a_1$  can be computed by  $V$  himself), and  $A_2$  starts with the leftmost  $\Sigma$  or  $\Pi$  symbol of  $A$ .  $P$  and  $V$  then repeatedly execute the following simplification steps:

- (1) If  $A_2$  is empty,  $V$  stops and accepts the claim iff  $a = a_1$ .
- (2) If  $A_1$  is nonempty,  $V$  replaces  $A$  by  $A_2$ , and replaces  $a$  by  $a - a_1 \pmod{p}$  or  $a/a_1 \pmod{p}$  (depending on the operator that connects  $A_1$  and  $A_2$ ). If  $V$  tries to divide  $a$  by  $a_1 = 0 \pmod{p}$ , he stops and accepts the claim iff  $a = 0 \pmod{p}$ .
- (3) Otherwise,  $P$  sends the polynomial descriptions  $q(z_i)$  of  $A'$  to  $V$ .  $V$  checks that  $a = q(0) + q(1) \pmod{p}$  or  $a = q(0) \cdot q(1) \pmod{p}$  (depending on the first symbol of  $A_2$ ), sends a random  $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  to  $P$ , replaces  $A$  by  $A'(z_i = r) \pmod{p}$ , and replaces  $a$  by  $q(r) \pmod{p}$ .

*Example.* Consider once more the expression  $A$  of the previous example, whose claimed value is  $a = 2$ . When  $P$  sends its polynomial  $q(z_1) = z_1^2 + 1$  to  $V$ ,  $V$  checks that  $q(0) \cdot q(1) = 1 \cdot 2 = a$ , sends  $z_1 = 3$  to  $P$ , replaces  $A$  by  $A'(z_1 = 3)$ , and replaces  $a$  by  $q(3) = 10$ . The new  $A$  starts with a nonempty  $A_1$ , whose value  $a_1 = (1 - 3) = -2$  can be computed by  $V$ .  $A$  and  $a$  are now adjusted to

$$A = \sum_{z_2 \in \{0,1\}} \prod_{z_3 \in \{0,1\}} (3z_2 + z_3),$$

$$a = 10 - (-2) = 12.$$

The functional form of this  $A$  is

$$A' = \prod_{z_3 \in \{0,1\}} (3z_2 + z_3),$$

whose polynomial representation is  $q(z_2) = 9z_2^2 + 3z_2$ . When  $V$  gets this polynomial from  $P$ , he checks that  $q(0) + q(1) = 0 + 12 = 12 = a$ , and picks  $z_2 = 2$  as his random choice.  $A$  and  $a$  are again adjusted to

$$A = \prod_{z_3 \in \{0,1\}} (6 + z_3),$$

$$a = q(2) = 9 \cdot 4 + 3 \cdot 2 = 42.$$

$P$  now sends  $q(z_3) = z_3 + 6$  as the polynomial representation of  $A'$ , and  $V$  checks that  $q(0) \cdot q(1) = 6 \cdot 7 = 42 = a$ . Finally,  $V$  chooses  $z_3 = 5$ , and verifies by himself that the value of

$$A'(z_3 = 5) = (6 + 5) = 11$$

is the same as  $a = q(5) = 5 + 6 = 11$ .

## THEOREM 6

- (1) When  $B$  is true and  $P$  is honest,  $V$  always accepts the proof.
- (2) When  $B$  is false,  $V$  accepts the proof with negligible probability.

## PROOF

- (1) An honest  $P$  can always justify his claimed values and polynomials.
- (2) The proof of this part is similar to the one used by Lund et al. [10] in their permanent proving protocol. A cheating prover who supplied an incorrect value of  $a$  must provide an incorrect polynomial  $q(z_t)$  to support his claim, since  $a$  is checked against  $q(0) + q(1) \pmod{p}$  or  $q(0) \cdot q(1) \pmod{p}$ . By the interpolation theorem, such an incorrect polynomial of degree  $t$  can agree with the correct polynomial on at most  $t$  of the  $p$  points in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . When the value of  $t$  is a polynomial and the value of  $p$  is exponential in the size of  $B$ , there is only a negligible probability that the incorrect  $q$  yields a correct value when evaluated at a random point  $r$  chosen by  $V$ . As a result, a cheating  $P$  is forced to provide incorrect values for successively smaller subexpressions, until he is exposed with overwhelming probability when  $V$  evaluates the final subexpression by himself.  $\square$

*Remark.* A single application of this protocol suffices to make the probability of cheating exponentially small, and there is no need to iterate it as in other interactive proofs. However, the protocol seems to be inherently sequential, and it is a major open problem whether it can be executed with a small (e.g., logarithmic) number of rounds. Note that the existence of a constant round protocol for IP would collapse the polynomial hierarchy to its second level, as shown by Boppana et al. [3].

## 5. Space-Bounded Verifiers

The interactive proofs introduced in Section 4 require polynomial time and polynomial space verifiers. In this section, we prove that the space bound can be greatly improved.

*Definition.* A verifier is called *weak* if

- (1) its running time is polynomial,
- (2) its workspace is logarithmic,
- (3) it has a two-way read-only access to a random tape,
- (4) its messages consist solely of the random bits it reads.

THEOREM 7. Any PSPACE language can be accepted by a weak verifier.

*Remarks.* Since the accessible portion of the random tape is polynomial, we cannot “cheat” by using the head position or the location of desirable substrings as super-logarithmic auxiliary storage. Note that without the two-way access, Fortnow and Sipser [4], proved that only languages in  $P$  can be accepted by such verifiers, and without condition 4, Condon and Rompel [private communication] have already shown that logspace verifiers can accept all of IP.

PROOF (SKETCH). To use such weak verifiers in our interactive proofs, we consider the particular PSPACE complete class of QBFs obtained by the standard reduction from deterministic polynomial space Turing machine com-

putations. We encode each configuration of such a computation (which consists of the contents of the tape, the position of the head, and the internal state) as a polynomially long vector  $X$  of Boolean variables. If  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are two configurations, then we can recursively express the existence of a legal transition of length  $2^k$  ( $k \geq 1$ ) between them by:

$$Q(X_1, X_2, 2^k) = \exists X_3 \forall x_4 \exists X_5 \exists X_6 \{ [x_4 \Rightarrow (X_5 = X_1) \wedge (X_6 = X_3)] \\ \wedge [\bar{x}_4 \Rightarrow (X_5 = X_3) \wedge (X_6 = X_2)] \wedge Q(X_5, X_6, 2^{k-1}) \}.$$

The final  $Q(X_1, X_{i+1}, 1)$  is the quantifier free 3CNF formula that characterizes a single move of the given Turing machine. In this expression  $X_3$  represents the middle configuration of the computation, the single Boolean variable  $x_4$  chooses which half of the computation we consider,  $X_5$  and  $X_6$  are new configuration names, and the rest of the expression states that both halves are legal transitions of length  $2^{k-1}$ . When  $X_1$  is the initial configuration and  $X_2$  is the unique accepting configuration (with tape, initial head position, and accepting state), we can express the acceptance condition by the polynomially long QBF obtained by unrolling this recursive definition.

Such QBFs are simple by definition. Their innermost 3CNF formulas can be arithmetized with de Morgan's laws (replacing each clause such as  $z_i + z_j + z_k$  by the logically equivalent  $1 - (1 - z_i)(1 - z_j)(1 - z_k)$ ) to yield only 0/1 values. Such values are preserved by the products that result from universal quantifiers. Since the Turing machine computation is deterministic, the existentially quantified configurations  $X_3$ ,  $X_5$ , and  $X_6$  are uniquely determined by the endpoint configurations  $X_1$ ,  $X_2$ , and the selector  $x_4$ . When such a  $\exists X_i$  is arithmetized, at most one of the exponentially many summands can be non-zero. We can thus prove by induction that the arithmetized value of such QBFs is either 0 or 1 (rather than  $O(2^{2^n})$ ), and allow the prover to use primes of logarithmic size.

The constant degree polynomials with logarithmic coefficients can be easily handled by weak verifiers. However, to evaluate the quantifier-free subexpressions by themselves, such verifiers need access to the random values assigned to the  $O(n)$  variables, which require too much storage space. We overcome this difficulty by giving the verifiers a two-way read-only access to their random tapes, where these values are stored as consecutive blocks of  $O(\log n)$  bits.  $\square$

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